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A B S T R A C T
To guide policymaking, decision makers require a good understanding of the long-term drivers of food security and their interactions. Scenario analysis is widely
considered as the appropriate tool to assess ‘wicked problems’, such as ensuring global food security, that are characterized by a high level of complexity and
uncertainty. This paper describes the development process, storylines and drivers of four new global scenarios that are speciﬁcally designed to explore global food
security up to the year 2050. To ensure the relevance, credibility and legitimacy of the scenarios, they have been developed using a participatory process, involving a
diverse group of stakeholders. The scenarios consist of storylines and a scenario database that presents projections for key drivers, which can be used as an input into
global simulation models.
1. Introduction
The question on ‘how to feed the world in 2050’ has received in-
creasing attention from policy makers, the media and scientists since
the surge in food prices in 2007/2008 (FAO, 2009). To progress on this
question and propose solutions, policy makers need insights into the
future development of food availability, access, utilization and stability
(FAO, 1996) as well as the underlying drivers, such as population
growth, economic development and technical change, which jointly
determine the state of future global food security.
Understanding long-term food security is a complicated issue be-
cause it has all the characteristics of a ‘wicked problem’ (Wilkinson and
Eidinow, 2008). Wicked problems are public problems that are char-
acterized by a high level of complexity, uncertainty and systemic
challenges that impact across local to global scales. They are seemingly
intractable because the inﬂuence of many social and political actors as
well as biophysical factors and are described as ‘messy’ because there is
no consensus on what is exactly the problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973).
The consequence is that diﬀerent perceptions of stakeholders will lead
to diverse and often opposing deﬁnitions of the problem.
Traditional policy planning based on historical trends is not ap-
propriate to explore the options to address the challenges posed by
wicked problems. A more suitable methodology is the use of a scenarios
that envisage a number of contrasting futures that diverge from the
historical trend (Wiebe et al., 2018). Scenario analysis has become the
standard approach to assess wicked problems, including climate change
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000), ecosystem change (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, 2005) and environmental challenges (UNEP, 2007) but
only recently emerged as a tool to assess global food security (IAASTD,
2009). Most recent studies use the Shared Socio-economic Pathways
(SSPs) (O'Neill et al., 2014), originally designed for climate change
assessments, to quantify global food demand and supply scenarios
(Valin et al., 2014; Hasegawa et al., 2015).
This paper describes the development process, storylines and drivers
of four global scenarios that were developed in collaboration with
stakeholders to assess global food security. As such, they can be con-
sidered as an alternative to, and can be contrasted with, the SSPs, which
were largely developed by the research community. The scenarios are
part of the FOODSECURE project (www.foodsecure.eu), which aims to
assess global food security by means of scenario analysis and modelling.
The FOODSECURE storylines and drivers presented in this paper have
been quantiﬁed by means of a number of global integrated assessment
models and used as a basis for developing and testing policies that
contribute to global food security (see Doelman et al., 2019; Kuiper
et al., 2019; Van Meijl et al., n.d. in this special issue).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents brief
background information on the deﬁnition of scenarios and possible
scenario types. Section 3 describes the participatory approach that was
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used to develop the scenario narratives. Section 4 summarizes the
method that was used to quantify the global projections for the main
scenario drivers. Section 5 presents the results, including the four sce-
nario storylines and projections for key main drivers. Section 6 presents
a discussion of the main ﬁndings and compares the FOODSECURE
scenarios with other recent scenario exercises. Section 7 provides
conclusions.
2. Scenarios: deﬁnitions and types
A number of deﬁnitions have been given for scenarios in the lit-
erature. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment deﬁnes scenario as a
“plausible and often simpliﬁed description of how the future may de-
velop, based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions
about key driving forces (e.g., rate of technology change, prices) and
relationships.” (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005, 547). Sce-
narios provide a means of dealing with complex and uncertain issues
such as future global food security, which depend on the interplay of a
large number of driving forces. It has been demonstrated that scenarios
can be a tool to inform science and policy (Chaudhury et al., 2013), can
guide the formulation of policies that are dependent on future ex-
pectations and can support the building of capacity for strategic plan-
ning (Vervoort et al., 2014). A common approach in large global in-
tegrated assessments is to develop creative storylines, often using
participatory methods with stakeholders that are subsequently modeled
to analyse the relationship between drivers and quantify the impact of
policies (Alcamo, 2008).
Several typologies have been proposed to group scenarios in the
literature (e.g. Notten et al., 2003; IPCC, 2019). Börjeson et al. (2006)
provide a typology based on the three principal questions that users
may want to pose about the future: What will happen?, What can
happen? How can a speciﬁc target be reached? These questions trans-
late into a typology of three major classes of scenarios that deal with
probable, possible and preferable future states, respectively. The ﬁrst
class, or projections, include baseline scenarios that describe the future
state of a system with no policy changes. They are also referred to as
‘business-as-usual’ and ‘reference’ scenarios. Baseline scenarios are
mostly used as a reference point to examine how a system changes
when a number of ‘what-if’ assumptions has been made. Examples are
the OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 (OECD, 2012) and the EU
Reference Scenario 2016: Energy, Transport and GHG Emissions Trends
to 2050 (Capros et al., 2016).
The second class, or explorative scenarios, are designed to give
room to ‘out of the box’ thinking; they typically involve the develop-
ment of a set of rich narratives that describe possible polar world views.
To facilitate easy communication and discussion of multiple futures,
scenario practitioners tend to work with a set of four scenarios that are
formulated along two, relatively independent, high impact and highly
uncertain dimensions of the system. The four scenarios can then be
compared using a matrix in which the dimensions form the axes.
Scenarios often cover multiple decades and sometimes centuries, and
allow for changes in the structure of the system and boundary condi-
tions. Explorative scenarios can be used to analyse and compare the
impact of policy decisions in the context of diﬀerent futures. Well
known examples are the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) and
the IPCC SRES scenarios Nakicenovic et al. (2000).
The ﬁnal class, normative scenarios, are designed to support vision
building. They involve the creation of stories or pathways that meet
speciﬁc outcomes or targets, for example the description of a future that
is desired or should be avoided by all means. Backcasting is used to
identify the pathways and decision points to reach a speciﬁc vision of
the future. An example is the UNEP Global Environmental Outlook
UNEP (2012).
We decided that the exploratory scenario type was the most ap-
propriate tool to assess future global food security. As we are mainly
interested in the long-run view (up to 2050), using projections with
only a single baseline scenario to represent the future does not seem
appropriate. The exploratory scenario approach - which deﬁnes four
polar future worlds - is better suited to deal with the high level of un-
certainty and complexity that characterizes future global food security
outcomes.
3. Participatory scenario and storyline development process
Alcamo and Henrichs (2008) present four criteria to evaluate the
quality of scenarios: (1) relevance; (2) credibility; (3) legitimacy, and;
(4) creativity. Involving stakeholders in the design of scenarios will
positively contribute to address and fulﬁll these criteria. For this reason,
we decided to adopt a strong participatory approach to guide the design
of the storylines and inform the quantiﬁcation of key drivers (described
in the next section).
The FOODSECURE scenarios were developed during two two-day
meetings and two webinars that took place in 2013 and 2014. The
process was designed and facilitated by a company specialized in sta-
keholder engagement processes and participatory scenario develop-
ment using a structured approach (Text S1). The events brought to-
gether around 19 diﬀerent stakeholders with a diverse set of
backgrounds. An eﬀort was made to invite a balanced set of stake-
holders, which equal representation taking into account aﬃliation and
gender. The same group of stakeholders were invited for all events to
ensure continuation of the process although in some cases new parti-
cipants from the same organizations replaced their colleagues.
The process to develop the scenarios consisted of the three main
steps: (1) the development of the scenario logic and storylines, (2) the
quantiﬁcation of key drivers, and (3) the validation of results. For the
ﬁrst step, the participants were organized in groups and asked to come
up with a list of key driving forces and uncertainties that inﬂuence
global food security. Throughout the workshops, participants stayed in
the same scenario group, which enabled them to become ‘experts’ in
their scenario. The selected key drivers included: population growth,
technical change, lifestyle and consumption patterns and income in-
equality. During group and plenary discussions, stakeholders selected
the ﬁnal two axes that deﬁne the scenario logic: (in)equality and sus-
tainability were chosen as most signiﬁcant dimensions. The storylines
were further developed in subsequent rounds of structured assignments
and group work followed by plenary sessions for discussion. The results
were subsequently used as a basis to quantify several key drivers.
After the two workshops, the scenario support team reﬁned the
storylines and driver quantiﬁcation. To validate the results, two webi-
nars were organized, which made it possible for stakeholders to com-
ment on the scenario narratives and the quantiﬁcation of the drivers.
The recommendations from the stakeholders were incorporated in the
ﬁnal version of the FOODSECURE scenario storylines and driver data-
base.
4. Quantiﬁcation of scenario drivers
To assess global food security and analyse the impact of policies, the
FOODSECURE scenarios were designed to be used as for global in-
tegrated assessment models that require projections and parametriza-
tion of exogenous driving forces. The most important are: (1) popula-
tion growth (also including urbanization), which is a key driver of
global food demand (Kearney, 2010); (2) economic development
(measured by Gross Domestic Product, GDP) and income change
(measured by GDP per capita), which are strongly associated with (the
change in) diets (Cirera and Masset, 2010) and (3) technological change
(i.e. agricultural productivity measured by crop yield and livestock
conversion eﬃciency), which is a key driving force of agricultural
production (Foley et al., 2011; Ray et al., 2013).
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature to ‘trans-
late’ stakeholder-proposed storylines into numerical series (Vliet et al.,
2010). Two approaches that have been regularly used in the
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development of climate change scenarios are ‘fuzzy set theory’, in
which scenario trends are ﬁrst described in linguistic form by stake-
holders after which a translation key is used to derive numerical values
(Kok et al., 2015) and ‘fuzzy cognitive maps’ (Jetter and Kok, 2014),
which use ﬂow diagrams to structure and quantify relationships. A
disadvantage of both approaches is that they often require prior expert
knowledge in order to propose realistic values that can be used as an
input into the models. This makes it often diﬃcult and time consuming
to apply the approaches in practice. For this reason, we explored a
novel alternative approach, which we termed ‘participatory trend
mapping’, to derive and quantify future trends of main drivers.
After the ﬁrst draft of the scenario storylines was ﬁnalized, stake-
holders were asked to think about the development of key drivers
consistent with the proposed storylines. Each group was given a set of
ﬁgures that depict the historical trend of several key drivers for the last
ﬁve decades (Fig. 1a). As the development of drivers is expected to
diﬀer across diﬀerent types of countries, historical information was
depicted for four country income groups using the World Bank classi-
ﬁcation: high-income countries, middle-income countries, low-income
countries and BRICS (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).
The stakeholders were subsequently asked to continue the trend line up
to 2050 for each of the drivers in such a way that they were consistent
with the scenario storylines but at the same time were still realistic
when compared with the historical trend (Fig. 1b–d). This exercise
stimulated the scenario groups to re-evaluate the scenario storylines
and logic, resulting in meaningful discussions and, in some occasions, a
revision of the scenario storyline. The diagrams with the stakeholder
proposed trends for each of the drivers, combined with qualitative in-
formation from the storylines, was the basis for the actual quantiﬁca-
tion of the drivers performed by the research team.
In order to make consistent and realistic driver projections, it is
important to consider historical patterns as well as theoretical re-
lationships. For example, in case of population growth it is essential to
consider changes in fertility, mortality, migration and education on
future trends (KC and Lutz, 2017). In case of GDP per capita growth,
long-run studies on historical economic growth demonstrate that eco-
nomic development strongly depends on the rate of innovation at the
technological frontier and the capacity and speed with which lagging
countries are able to absorb new technologies and catch up (Fagerberg
and Verspagen, 2002; Dellink et al., 2017). Constructing high-quality
projections is therefore a complex, resource-intensive and specialist
undertaking. For this reason, we decided to use population and GDP
projections of a previous scenario studies as a starting point and adapt
them to the storylines proposed by the stakeholders. A similar approach
was used by Westhoek et al. (2006) and Kok et al. (2018), who prepared
scenarios for the assessment of land use and climate change in Europe,
respectively.
Our main source of scenario projections for population and GDP
were the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs), which were also
developed recently (Kriegler et al., 2012; O’Neill et al., 2017). We
started with comparing the SSP storylines and projections for popula-
tion and GDP per capita with the FOODSECURE storylines and driver
patterns proposed by the stakeholders and identiﬁed similarities and
discrepancies. Next, for each of the FOODSECURE scenarios and
country income group combinations, matching SSP projections for po-
pulation and GDP per capita were selected. In several cases, we decided
to scale the SSP projections up- or downwards to match the trends
described in FOODSECURE scenario storylines. The scaling factors
where chosen in such a way that consistency was ensured both within
(i.e. relative trends of diﬀerent income groups in the same scenario) and
between (i.e. relative trends of the same income group in diﬀerent
scenarios) scenarios. Details of the approach are provided in Text S2.
Finally, national projections for GDP per capita and population were
combined to create the GDP projections presented below.
The SSP Database (2016) does not provide harmonized projections
for crop yield and livestock feed conversion eﬃciency growth, the in-
dicators that are normally used to model technical change in the crop
and livestock sector in global assessment models. Hence, we used an-
other approach to construct projections for these indicators. Crop sci-
entists, who analysed long-term historical crop yield patterns, have
Fig. 1. Example of participatory trend mapping with maize yield projections. (a) Historical maize yield trends for four country income categories shared with the
stakeholders. (b–c) Results from the participatory trend exercise prepared by stakeholders that show scenario speciﬁc maize yield projections for three scenarios: 1%
World (ONEPW), Too Little Too Late (TLTL) and Ecotopia (ECO). The diagram for the Food For All but Not Forever (FFANF) scenario is presented in Text S1.
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pointed out that yield growth generally exhibits a linear trend (Fischer
and Edmeades, 2010; Hafner, 2003). Grassini et al. (2013) investigated
past yield trends in 36 regions and concluded that yield projections
based on linear models should be used to derive future food production
projections. This contradicts with previous assessments, which used
compound growth rates to construct yield projections, resulting in
overly optimistic scenarios (Grassini et al., 2013; World Resources
Institute, 2013). In conformity with the agronomic literature, we used
linear instead of compound growth rates to project a baseline for future
yield of eight crop groups at broad regional levels. The baseline was
combined with breakpoints and plateaus to model the introduction of
radical technologies (sharp rise in yield) and dramatic impact of climate
change (sharp decrease in yield) that were proposed by the stakeholders
and clearly depicted in some of the diagrams that resulted from the
participatory trend mapping exercise (e.g. see Fig. 1).
In contrast to crop yield, there is much less information available on
the past and future trajectories of livestock feed conversion eﬃciencies
(e.g. Bouwman et al., 2005; Wirsenius et al., 2010; Pradhan et al.,
2013), which are deﬁned as the amount of feed required by per live-
stock category. For the FOODSECURE scenarios we used livestock feed
conversion eﬃciencies from Herrero et al. (2014) and Fricko et al.
(2017), which were computed for three livestock sectors (cattle, pigs
and poultry and dairy cattle) at the broad regional level. We decided to
use the same business as usual scenario for all four FOODSECURE
scenarios as projections are based on biophysical ceiling values which
are unlikely to increase dramatically in the future.
To facilitate the modelling of the scenarios, the driver projections
were aggregated into 19 country groups that represent diﬀerent global
economic and regional blocks, and are used as units in the global si-
mulation models (Text S2). All projections are stored in the FOODSE-
CURE Scenario Driver Database (Van Dijk et al., 2019).
5. Results
Fig. 2 shows the four FOODSECURE scenarios and their position in
the scenario matrix. The stakeholders decided to organize the scenarios
around two axes that highlight two major uncertainties: (1) lifestyle
and use of natural resources ranging from a sustainable to an un-
sustainable world and (2) equality, with the two polar views of an equal
and a highly unequal world. Depending on the scenario storyline, (in)
equality can refer both to inter- and intra-national diﬀerences in
Fig. 2. FOODSECURE scenario matrix showing the two axes that deﬁne the
scenario logic: (in)equality and sustainability, resulting in four diﬀerent sce-
narios: 1% World (ONEPW), Ecotopia (ECO), Too little, too late (TLTL) and
Food For All but Not Forever (FFANF). Ta
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income. The combination of the two axis deﬁnes the four diﬀerent
scenarios: 1% World (ONEPW), Ecotopia (ECO), Too Little, Too Late
(TLTL) and Food For All but Not Forever (FFANF). The storylines of the
four scenarios are brieﬂy described below and Table 1 presents a
comparison of key elements and drivers for each of the scenarios.
5.1. Storylines
5.1.1. 1% world (ONEPW)
The 1% World (ONEPW) is a combination of a sustainable but un-
equal world. In this scenario, global wealth is very unequally dis-
tributed both within and across countries. An elite group of ‘new rich’ –
that constitutes around one per cent of total population – controls the
major corporations dominating the majority of markets and owning
most of natural resources. The greater part of the resources, in parti-
cular water and land, is located in developing countries. The scarcity of
resources in these countries has increased considerably over the past
forty years. Authority and power have been shifted from the govern-
ment to the elite. Governments have cut budgets and reduced the ex-
penditures in public services, which are mostly replaced by private
services and are mainly geared towards the needs of the elite. To pro-
tect their assets, the elite have invested in research and development to
create private solutions for global environmental problems, which have
resulted in a number of path-breaking technologies to overcome the
problems of climate change, reduce pollution and waste and protect the
environment. Technological advances also include agricultural tech-
nologies that have resulted in an increase in crop yield to ensure the
eﬃcient and low-cost production of food. Food security is ensured for
the elite in the 1% world scenario. The rest 99% of people are fed, since
the quantity of food has been provided through high eﬃcient and
technologically advanced production systems. However, the nutritional
quality of the staple food is insuﬃcient, especially regarding micro
nutrients.
5.1.2. Ecotopia (ECO)
The Ecotopia (ECO) scenario is a combination of a sustainable and
equal world. It assumes an equal society both within and between
countries, in which all people are well educated and wealth is equally
distributed. Free movement of people is guaranteed. Local policies
support development of rural areas. New agricultural production
technologies are developed that focus on sustainability and zero waste.
Urban agriculture is highly developed and aquaculture is sustainable.
New and diversiﬁed renewable energy sources are applied, which re-
place conventional fossil fuel energy sources. Environmental and agri-
cultural innovations are accessible for everybody due to their open
source nature. Trade policies are aligned to food security and stable
ecosystems. The global population has access to sustainable diets.
Water and food choices and basic needs are covered. All food is safe and
there are new sources of food available and socio-cultural aspects are
respected in the diet. The concept of ‘prosumers’ is introduced, where
consumers of food are at the same time also producers of food. In the
Ecotopia scenario the problem of food insecurity has been solved by
2050.
5.1.3. Food For All but Not Forever (FFANF)
The Food For All but Not Forever (FFANF) scenario is a combination
of an unsustainable but relatively equal world. In this scenario con-
sumption and growth are more important than sustainability in the
mindset of the global population. The rapid economic and employment
growth, accompanied by more intensive multilateral international co-
operation, has led to free movement of goods and people, better health
and education systems, more democracy and eradication of hunger.
Wealth is more equally distributed and poverty has been reduced, since
countries have adopted taxation systems to equalize incomes and
property within societies. At the same time, the environment has de-
teriorated as a consequence of more and cheaper fossil fuels and a shift
to intensive, but polluting agricultural systems. The overuse of pesti-
cides and fertilizers has substantially decreased soil fertility on all
continents across diﬀerent ecosystems. The rainforest has largely been
destroyed and replaced by farm land. In addition, the climate change
problem has worsened and most recently the global economy is se-
verely suﬀering from climate-induced disasters, such as hurricanes,
ﬂoods and droughts. Food security is this scenario has been achieved,
but in an unsustainable way.
5.1.4. Too Little Too Late (TLTL)
The Too Little Too Late (TLTL) scenario is a combination of an
unsustainable and unequal world. In the TLTL scenario, several new
ﬁnancial crises have resulted in a sharp decrease in economic growth.
This situation has sparked national political crises, which in turn have
given room for opportunistic behavior. Governance at the international
level has also worsened: in 2050, there is no international cooperation
and the whole UN system has dissolved. All of this has led to an unequal
society, which consists of the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, with the gap
between the two groups widening over time. A select elite group (‘the
haves’) holds the power and protects own interests, while the majority
of people (the ‘have nots’) is poor with limited access to food, health
and education. There is monopolized access to knowledge and tech-
nology: the rich have access to modern technologies, while the poor do
not. At the same time, the destructive eﬀects of climate change, caused
by uncontrolled depletion of (fossil) natural resources, has caused
biodiversity loss, an increase in natural disasters, and disputes about
water. Regarding food security, only the small minority of the ‘haves’
beneﬁts from food produced in a very unsustainable way, while the
majority suﬀers from food insecurity.
5.2. Drivers
Fig. 3(a-c) depict the projections for population, GDP per capita and
crop yield growth by scenario and country income group. Population
growth in the high income group is the highest in FFANF because mi-
gration plays a prominent role. It is assumed that people have possi-
bility and are willing to migrate from poor to rich countries. The result
of migration is high population growth in high income countries and
low population growth in the other country groups. In the ONEPW
scenario, population growth in the high income group (and medium-
income and BRICS countries) is also high because the assumption is
made that higher incomes make it possible to sustain larger families and
households. The TLTL scenario assumes that population growth in the
high income countries, BRICS and middle income countries is slowing
down, while expansion continues in the low income countries, driven
by increasing diﬀerences in global income. Finally, in the ECO scenario,
the storyline indicates that poverty is decreasing in developing coun-
tries and education and health systems are improving, leading to a
stagnation in population growth.
Comparing scenarios, overall GDP per capita growth is highest in
the FFANF scenario and lowest in the TLTL scenario, while the ECO and
ONEPW are in the middle range. The FFNAF scenario sketches a world
with rapid growth and growing equality, but at the same time with an
implosion of the global economy in 2045, which has a clear impact on
the future developments in the scenario. In contrast, the TLTL scenario
foresees a fragmented world that is characterized by global income
divergence and relatively low levels of development. The ONEPW
projects increasing inequality, but with relatively high growth in all
regions, particularly in the high income countries. The high growth in
income per capita in the high income countries occurs due to innova-
tions that are mainly adopted in the regions where the elite resides.
GDP growth in other regions is expected to be lower, because of the rise
in global inequality. The main theme of the ECO scenario is a sustain-
able and more equitable world where GDP per capita in the high in-
come nearly stagnates while other countries are catching up, leading to
an convergence in income levels.
M. van Dijk, et al. Global Food Security 24 (2020) 100352
5
The yield projections are quite diverse across scenarios (note that
the ﬁgure only presents the results for maize and other grains, similar
projections are available for seven other crop groups). An important
part of the storyline in the ONEPW is rapid technological advancement
(e.g. new breeds and cultivation techniques) that occurs at speciﬁc
points in time (around mid-2030) resulting in breakpoints in the crop
yield projections. Innovations emerge in high income countries but
diﬀuse with a lag to other regions. The TLTL scenario assumes crop
yield is going down in low-income regions due to the impact of en-
vironmental catastrophes, resulting from climate change. The middle-
income countries reach a sort of plateau, while the yield in high-income
countries increases, but at a slower rate, because of more resilient
agricultural systems. In the FFANF scenario, yield is increasing rapidly
in all regions due to the international diﬀusion of knowledge and more
Fig. 3. GDP, population and crop yield projections by income group. Income groups were deﬁned using the World Bank country classiﬁcation: High income (>USD
12,616 per capita), Middle income (USD 1,036-USD 12,615 per capita), BRICS (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Low income (<USD 1,035 per
capita). (a) Population trends; (b) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) trends and (c) maize yield trends. Dashed line shows the historical linear trend for the period
1990–2012 and extrapolated up to 2050. Historical information from the World Development Indicators (population and GDP, www.wdi.worldbank.org) and
FAOSTAT (maize yield, http://www.fao.org/faostat). Projections prepared by authors on the basis of stakeholder input (Van Dijk et al., 2019).
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intensive production approaches. However, after around 2030, yield
growth reaches a plateau and eventually collapses, due to the negative
impact of climate change around 2045. The ECO scenario foresees the
existence of open source technologies that rapidly diﬀuse inter-
nationally. As a consequence, the low-income countries will close a
large part of the yield gap by 2050. The crop yield in high-income
countries will slightly decrease or stagnate, since yields would have
reached the biophysical maximum potential by 2050.
6. Discussion
6.1. Scenario development process
To speed up the process and leave more room for the quantiﬁcation
of drivers, the initial scenario development plan was to use an existing
set of scenarios (so-called ‘fast-track’ scenarios (Kok et al., 2011), in this
case the SSP scenarios) as a basis for the FOODSECURE storylines.
However, during the process, stakeholders raised the concern that the
SSPs did not cover all plausible futures and are too strongly geared
towards climate change, and are therefore not able to adequately take
into account the relevant aspects of future food security. To accom-
modate these concerns, we decided go through a full scenario devel-
opment process of deﬁning key uncertainties and develop the scenario
logic from the bottom up. The lesson that can be drawn from this is that
stakeholders are likely to be unwilling to accept scenarios that have
been created for a diﬀerent subject and purpose. Therefore researchers
and scenario developers should be careful in using existing storylines as
basis for scenario development as these might be rejected by stake-
holders.
Further, it was planned to use the Story-And-Simulation (SAS) ap-
proach (Alcamo, 2008) to introduce a feedback loop between the
storylines developed by stakeholders and associated quantitative model
results. Unfortunately, because of the aforementioned change in the
scenario planning process, the storylines were not completed after the
ﬁrst workshop, which made it impossible to prepare model simulations
in time for the second workshop. Given the available resources, it was
not possible to organize additional workshops and the iteration be-
tween stakeholder-determined storylines and expert-driven model runs
had to be omitted. As a result, the consistency check between storylines
and model results has been solely done by researchers, which is a clear
shortcoming in the participatory scenario building process.
6.2. Quantiﬁcation of drivers
A novel approach – participatory trend mapping – was used to ob-
tain projections for a number of important long-run drivers of food
security. We found that this approach was very useful in discussing and
assessing a relative large number of driving forces with stakeholders in
a relatively short time. The use of pictures with historical trends proved
a simple, intuitive and eﬀective way of quickly informing stakeholders
about indicators they were previously not familiar with and helped to
generate realistic future trends. A positive side eﬀect was that in several
instances the mapping of drivers led to a renewed discussion about the
internal consistency of the scenarios and consequential adjustment. A
disadvantage of participatory trend mapping, in contrast with fuzzy set
theory, which directly provides numerical values, is that researchers
still have to do the ﬁnal translation from visual trends into numbers.
This might introduce a bias and highlights the need for the validation of
results by stakeholders after which the projections can still be revised.
Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that participatory trend mapping is
interesting and new new tool that can also be used in other scenario
building exercises.
6.3. Comparison with other scenarios
Van Vuuren et al. (2012) (also see Van Vuuren and Carter, 2014)
proposed a typology of six scenario ‘families’ that share perspectives on
key uncertainties regarding future developments and, as a result, also
have similar assumptions for diﬀerent driving forces. The six identiﬁed
families include: Economic Optimism scenarios, Reformed Market sce-
narios, Global Sustainable Development scenarios, Regional Competi-
tion scenarios, Regional Sustainable Development scenarios, and
Fig. 3. (continued)
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Business-as-usual scenarios. The FOODSECURE scenarios – together
with other global scenario-based assessments – can be mapped against
these scenario families (Table 2). Apart from the ONEPW and, to a
lesser extent ECO, it is relatively straightforward to classify the FOO-
DSECURE scenarios. We decided to allocate the ONEPW to the Re-
formed markets type because it also features rapid economic develop-
ment and technological change as well as environmental protection.
However, the ﬁt is not perfect as inequality, a key element of ONEPW, is
not captured and also the population trend is diﬀerent. ECO shows
many similarities with the Global sustainable development scenario
family but also includes elements from the Regional sustainability
group of scenarios, in particular the focus on local markets.
Fig. 4 compares the projections for population, GDP and yield with
that of previous scenarios studies. It reveals that the FOODSECURE GDP
projections are distributed evenly across the plausible range, while
populations trajectories cover a smaller bandwidth. This can be partly
explained by the fact that older assessments (e.g. the IPCC SRES sce-
narios) tend to have higher population projections than more recent
assessments. The yield projections describe a wide range of possible
pathways, even approaching the outermost projection in the sample of
reviewed scenarios. Overall, the comparison shows that the
FOODSECURE scenarios capture a wide range of possible future path-
ways, which are in range with the other global integrated scenario-
based assessments without being too extreme.
7. Conclusions
This paper describes the development process and results from a
participatory scenario exercise to construct a set of global scenarios for
global food security analysis. The outcome of the process are four dif-
ferent scenarios that cover a large spectrum of possible futures that are
relevant from a food security perspective. The FOODSECURE scenarios
are deﬁned along two axes: (in)equality, and (un)sustainable lifestyle
and use of natural resources. They consist of a set of storylines and a
database with projections of key drivers that can be used as an input
into global assessment models for further quantiﬁcation and analysis
(e.g. Doelman et al., 2019; Kuiper et al., 2019; Van Meijl et al., n.d.).
A number of conclusions can be drawn from our experience in
building the FOODSECURE scenarios. First, a participatory approach
towards scenario development, involving a diverse group of stake-
holders leads to the creation of innovative and diverse scenarios. This is
underlined by the ﬁnding that at least one of the FOODSECURE
Table 2
FOODSECURE scenarios and other scenario-based assessments mapped against ‘scenario families’. Scenario families are sets of scenarios with similar perspectives on
key uncertainties regarding future developments (Van Vuuren and Carter, 2014). FOODSECURE mapping added by authors. *indicates scenarios that are not
completely consistent with the assigned scenario family.
Scenario archetypes FOODSECURE SSPs IPCC-SRES MA UNEP GEO-3
Economic optimism FFANF SSP5 A1F1 Market ﬁrst
Reformed markets ONEPW* Global orchestration Policies ﬁrst
Global sustainable development ECO* SSP1 B1 Techno garden Sustainability ﬁrst
Regional competition TLTL SSP3/SSP4 A2 Order from strength Security ﬁrst
Regional Sustainability B2* Adapting mosaic
Business-as-usual SSP2 B2*
Fig. 4. FOODSECURE drivers compared with driver projections prepared by other studies. (a) Population projections; (b) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) projections;
and (c) cereal yield projections. Historical information from the World Development Indicators (population and GDP, www.wdi.worldbank.org) and FAOSTAT
(maize yield, http://www.fao.org/faostat). Apart from the FOODSECURE scenarios, ﬁgures include projections from 10 global studies described in Van Dijk and
Meijerink (2014) and the SSPs (SSP Database, 2016).
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scenario storylines has characteristics that are substantially diﬀerent
from the scenarios that can be found in the literature. Second, a fast-
track approach towards scenario building, which aims to reﬁne and
adapt already existing scenarios is not without diﬃculties and risk. In
this study, stakeholders were not convinced by the selected fast-track
scenarios, which led to substantial delay and, eventually, the develop-
ment of a complete new set of scenarios. Finally, participatory trend
mapping, a novel approach ﬁrst tested in this paper, in combination
with thorough validation, proved to be a useful tool to derive realistic
trends of long-term driving forces of global food security.
To explore and quantify the high level of uncertainty that is an in-
herent part of modelling global systematic challenges, such as food
security, the common approach is to compare the results of various
models over a range of scenarios (Rosenzweig et al., 2013; Warszawski
et al., 2014). So far, there have been only a limited number of these
exercises related to future food production and demand, and all of them
used the Shared Socio-economic Pathways as a reference (Valin et al.,
2014; Hasegawa et al., 2018). The FOODSECURE scenarios can be
considered as an alternative to the SSPs, with (partly) diﬀerent story-
lines and drivers. It would be an interesting exercise to compare and
contrast the modelling of both sets of scenarios in order to obtain in-
sights on the range of potential future food security outcomes as well as
policies to address them.
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